The Fighting Words Doctrine-Is There a Clear and Present Danger to the Standard? by Kobel, Fran-Linda
Volume 84 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 84, 
1979-1980 
10-1-1979 
The Fighting Words Doctrine-Is There a Clear and Present Danger 
to the Standard? 
Fran-Linda Kobel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Fran-Linda Kobel, The Fighting Words Doctrine-Is There a Clear and Present Danger to the Standard?, 84 
DICK. L. REV. 75 (1979). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol84/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
The Fighting Words Doctrine - Is
There a Clear and Present Danger to
the Standard?
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court of the United States has described the first
amendment's' guarantee of freedom of speech as, "the matrix, the
indispensible condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 2
Speech provides a vehicle for the free flow of information, opinion,
and debate without which, the continued growth of society is
threatened.
Although the first amendment prohibition is written in absolute
terms, the Supreme Court has never held that all speech, regardless
of its content, manner of expression, or context, falls within the pro-
tection of the first amendment.3 The Supreme Court has consistently
maintained that certain forms or classes of speech may be regulated,
prohibited or punished without violating the constitutional mandate.
Illustrative of such a class are the expressions encompassed by
the doctrine of fighting words. Often labeled as abusive or offensive
speech, fighting words are classically defined as "speech which by its
very utterance inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach
of peace."4 Kipling perhaps most clearly expressed the essence of
the fighting words doctrine when he wrote, "[Y]ou must not call a
1. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or press." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
3. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). Justice Harlan writing
for the Court asserted:
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association as protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments are 'absolutes,' not only in [the] undoubted
sense that where the Constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the
sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading
of the First Amendment.
Id
Similarly, Mr. Justice Harlan maintained, "We venture to believe that neither Hamilton
nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make crimi-
nal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress would be unconstitutional
interference with free speech." Froheverk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
Accord, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) ("But, although the rights of free
speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolutes."); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("ITIhe protection of [free speech] even as to previous restraint
is not absolutely limited.").
4. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
man a bastard unless you are prepared to prove it on his front
teeth."5 As the title of the doctrine suggests, it is the potentiality for
violent confrontations that underscores the regulation or punishment
of such speech.
The doctrine of fighting words, however, has generated a con-
frontation between two fundamental principles. Society has a legiti-
mate interest in the prevention of violence and self-help, as well as in
the peaceful resolution of conflict through the judicial system. To
effectuate this legitimate interest, most states have enacted statutes
aimed at the deterrence and punishment of activities that would re-
sult in a breach of peace. Many of these statutes prohibit the use of
fighting words through criminal sanctions against the speaker for the
utterance of such words.6 If, however, the essence of the first amend-
ment protection is to foster the cultivation and exchange of ideas,
then any regulation of speech or punishment for its content would
threaten the very means of communicating those thoughts and
would be counter to the clear dictates of the first amendment.7
The Supreme Court has struggled for many years with this com-
plex paradox, searching for a methodology that meets the demands
of the first amendment while recognizing the state's interest in
preventing violent exchanges. Currently, the Supreme Court has set-
tled on a mode of analysis that avoids this confrontation by affording
"fighting words" constitutional protection unless an imminent threat
of violent retaliation by the actual addressee is present.8 The
Supreme Court has so consistently incorporated clear and present
danger considerations9 into its analysis of the doctrine of fighting
words that a separate doctrine is no longer appropriate.' 0 Rather,
5. R. KIPLING, The Drums of the Fore andAft, in KIPLING'S STORIES 8 (1931).
6. See, e.g., note 92 and accompanying text infra.
7. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971), Justice Harlan writing for the Court
commented:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words with-
out also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process ...
[L]inguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous
of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive
function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the
overall message sought to be communicated.
Id
8. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974).
9. See note 35 and accompanying text infra. The clear and present danger test was
formulated by Justice Holmes in Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes
writing for the majority noted that the circumstances that surround the speech may restrict the
operation of the first amendment:
The question in every case is whether words . . . are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.
Id at 52.
10. See Part V infra.
the desired balance between first amendment protection and the pre-
vention of violent confrontations is achieved by direct application of
the clear and present danger test. This flexible test permits the courts
to deal with each factual situation individually, while affording com-
plete constitutional protection to speech, however abusive, that does
not present a clear and present danger of unlawful behavior.
II. The Development of the Fighting Words Doctrine
A. Constitutional Context
Despite the lack of differentiation between types of speech by
the first amendment, the Supreme Court has divided speech into two
classifications." In some instances, the Court has proclaimed that
freedom of speech is a preferred freedom entitled to strict constitu-
tional protection.' 2 In these situations, the Court permits regulation
or limitation of speech only if a clear and present danger of substan-
tive harm' 3 exists that the government has a right to prevent.' 4 In
other situations, the Court has determined that the objectionable
speech is outside the protection of the first amendment. '" Regulation
or punishment of this brand of speech is permitted regardless of the
fact that a clear and present danger does not exist.
Within this framework of protected versus unprotected speech,
the Court has developed various classes of speech. The extent of the
first amendment protection afforded to a particular discourse is de-
pendent upon the class within which the respective speech falls.' 6
This hierarchy of speech includes obscenity, '7 commercial speech,' 8
1I. See Note, "Offensive Speech " and the First Amendment 53 B. L. REV. 835, 836-42
(1973).
12. E.g.. Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77, 88 (1949): Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945).
13. See note 35 and accompanying text infra.
14. See Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
15. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952).
16. For an excellent discussion of the Court's categorization technique in freedom of
speech cases, see Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear and Present Danger Test. Toward a Principled
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Revital-
izing the Clear and Present Danger Test].
17. At the lowest level within the hierarchy of the classes of speech lies obscenity that
evokes no constitutional protection. See Paris v. Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 479 (1957). At least one commentator suggests that obscene
material might be punished or prohibited upon a mere showing of a rational basis for doing so.
The author asserts that a rational basis has been found in "the belief that obscenity is to some
extent at least responsible for antisocial behavior." Shea, "'Don't Bother to Smile When You
Call Me That--Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 (1974-75) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Don't Bother to Smile]. The underlying rationale for the lack of constitutional
protection afforded obscenity has been attributed to the offensiveness of its content to contem-
porary moral standards and its inherent worthlessness. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 486-87 (1957).
18. Just above obscenity, lies commercial speech. At present, the Court affords commer-
libel and slander 9 and symbolic speech,2" although these characteri-
zations are by no means exhaustive.2'
The development of the fighting words doctrine, however, illus-
trates that the classification of speech is not rigid. Originally, fight-
ing words were afforded no constitutional protection.22 Yet
presently, a presumption of constitutionality is afforded fighting
words until it is shown that an imminent threat of harm by the actual
addressee is present.23 Significantly, the fighting words doctrine has
cial speech, "which does no more than propose a commercial transaction," constitutional pro-
tection. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). See
also Bates v. O'Steen State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The extent of the protection is
still somewhat unclear. The court has held that commercial speech is not exempt from regula-
tion when it is untruthful, deceptive or misleading. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). See Bates v. O'Steen State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 381 (1977) ([the state] "may pay heed to the commonsense differences between commer-
cial speech and other varieties."). The present Court's willingness to endow commercial
speech with a degree of constitutional protection stems from the recognition that consumers
have an interest in the free flow of commercial information. Ready access to such information
may be vital to intelligent decision making in today's complex and competitive marketplace.
Id at 765.
19. The extent of first amendment protection allotted to defamatory speech is dependent
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Compare New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a public official cannot recover damages for libel absent a find-
ing of actual malice), with, Times Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (a finding of actual malice is not necessary for recovery in a
suit involving the libel of an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure).
The greater protection afforded to defamation of public officials or figures may be derived
from a general feeling that, "[diebate on such matters should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks .. " New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In contrast, where the
expression is purely "private defamatory falsehood, its value to the public is slight, and the
danger to an individual's reputation outweighs it." Don't Bother to Smile, supra note 15, at 7.
20. Symbolic speech might be generally defined as the expression of ideas through con-
duct other than verbalization. Revitalizing the Clear and Present Danger Test, supra note 14, at
66.
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court devised a four prong test by
which to analyze regulation or punishment of symbolic speech. The Court has maintained
that a government regulation should be upheld if:
(1) The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment,
(2) The regulation furthers an important or substantial government interest,
(3) The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and,
(4) The incidental restriction upon alleged first amendment freedom is no greater
than is necessary to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
Id at 377.
Despite this elaborate test for regulation of symbolic speech, the Court has not always
strictly followed it. "In practice, the government's burden has been even easier than expected
because, in applying the test, the Court has not required a showing of a substantial govern-
mental interest, but merely one that is imaginary or non-existent, regardless of its lack of
importance or substantiality." Revitalizing the Clear and Present Danger Test, supra note 14, at
66.
21. One author suggests there is some indication that the Court is developing a special
class for "claims of access to public speech forum." Revitalizing the Clear and Present Danger
Test, supra note 14, at 67. Compare Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975) with, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
22. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
23. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
transcended its original classification to achieve a new position that
traditionally has been reserved for the most constitutionally pro-
tected forms of speech.24
B. The Origin of the Fighting Words Doctrine
The fighting words doctrine initially appeared in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire. 25 Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a state
statute that prohibited addressing "any offensive, derisive or annoy-
ing word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or public
place,"26 when he referred to a police officer as a fascist.27
The Supreme Court rejected Chaplinsky's contention that the
statute deprived him of his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
speech. The Court held that the right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances. Rather, "[t]here are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Con-
stitutional problem," 28 and such include the utterance of fighting
words. The Court noted that fighting words are not an essential part
of an exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.29
The offensiveness of the speech and the corresponding potenti-
ality for a violent response was not to be judged from the perception
of the particular individual involved. Rather, the Court opined that
the "test is what men of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight."3 Em-
24. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
25. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26. Id at 569.
27. Chaplinsky had been addressing pedestrians on a city street when approached by a
marshal who requested that he leave. Chaplinsky responded, "[Ylou are a God damned rack-
eteer and a damned fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of
Fascists." Id. He was arrested and charged with violation of § 9378.2 of the municipal code
and subsequently convicted.
28. Id. at 571-72.
29. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Justice Mprphy referred to the
Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940), wherein the
Court held that, "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any... opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the speaker was charged with inciting a
breach of the peace when he played a record that characterized Roman Catholics in offensive
terms before two bystanders who were Catholic. It is interesting to note that the Court in
reversing the conviction held that the utterances were constitutionally protected as they were
not directed to the person of the bystander, and therefore, could only be punished upon a
showing of a clear and present danger that unlawful activity would occur. The Court deter-
mined that the requisite clear and present danger was noticeably absent.
This distinction is worth clarification. The fighting words doctrine is only invoked when
the allegedly offensive words have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to
whom individually, the remark is addressed.
30. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
phasis was placed on the words expressed rather than on the actual
immediacy of violent confrontation. Moreover, the Supreme Court
readily accepted the New Hampshire legislature's determination that
the mere utterance of fighting words precipitated violent responses
by the average addressee.3
Implicit in the Court's analysis in Chaplinsky is the Court's be-
lief that the New Hampshire statute prohibited verbal acts, not pure
speech.32 Having made this distinction, the Court easily designated
fighting words as constitutionally unprotected, avoiding a direct con-
frontation with the language of the first amendment.33
Despite the appearance of a broad brush treatment of the sub-
ject, the Supreme Court in cases subsequent to Chaplinsky has in-
creasingly narrowed the situations when convictions based on the
utterance of fighting words will be upheld. Significantly, the
Supreme Court has shifted the emphasis from the content of the par-
ticular words expressed and their effect on the average addressee to
the potential for a violent retaliation by the actual addressee.34 By
altering the focal point of examination, the Court has incorporated
the clear and present danger test into the fighting words doctrine.
C. The Clear and Present Danger Test
The clear and present danger test provides that the printed or
spoken word may not be the subject of prior restraint or subsequent
punishment absent a showing that such activity creates a clear and
present danger of bringing about a substantial evil that the govern-
ment has the right to prevent.35 Whether an utterance is likely to
result in danger that justifies a restriction upon the freedom of
31. Id The Court adopted the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's test for the determi-
nation of whether speech falls within the fighting words exception.
In sustaining the conviction the Court found the statute to be narrowly drawn and that
Chaplinsky's expressions fell within the fighting words class of speech.
32. Id at 574. See Don't Bother to Smile, supra note 15, at 9 where the author suggests
"the rational for assigning unprotected status was that fighting words were not a form of com-
municative speech but rather a medium of something approaching a physical assault." This
distinction is mere fiction. What the Chaplinsky Court actually did was to classify a particular
type of speech as "non-speech."
33. Contra, Aimmer, The Meaning ofSymbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29 (1973). Professor Aimmer observed:
It is not without significance that the Court, in a first amendment context, often uses
the word 'expression' as the equivalent of speech. Most would agree it is the freedom
to express ideas and feelings, not merely the freedom to engage in verbal locations,
which constitutes the core meaning of the first amendment. [As Justice Holmes
stated], "free trade in ideas" may not be reduced to mere trade in words. It is the
ideas expressed, and not just a particular form of expression, that must be protected if
the underlying first amendment values are to be realized.
Id at 33-34.
34. See notes 76-87 and accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); West Virginia State
Bd. ofEd. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Schneck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
speech is a question of proximity and degree. 6 As the Court in
Bridges v. California37 stressed, "[tihe question of proximity and de-
gree cannot be completely captured in a formula. . . . [T]he clear
and present danger rule is a working principle that [requires that] the
substantive evil be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished."3
The Supreme Court has not consistently defined what is neces-
sary to fulfill the danger aspect of the test. In some instances the
Court has announced that a substantial state interest must be pres-
ently threatened.39 In other cases, the Court has required that the
danger be imminent ° or substantial and serious."a More often, the
Court has asserted that a determination of whether a sufficient dan-
ger to invoke the doctrine is present must be made in an ad hoc
fashion. 2 Consistent with this formulation, the clear and present
danger test has been applied in various situations a 3 including: crim-
inal prosecutions for speech in opposition to war;' advocating the
overthrow of the government4 5 or the commission of unlawful acts;
46
criticism of courts or judges;47 and picketing.
4
36. See American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (the Court held
that the term clear and present danger is not a mechanical test in every case touching first
amendment freedoms, without regard to the context of its application). See, e.g., Schafer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (the court stressed that the test was one of degree); Schneck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1920).
37. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
38. Id at 211,213.
39. See Elbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. E.g., Bartlett v. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed., 319 U.S. 624, (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
41. Bridges v. California, 317 U.S. 252 (1941).
42. Accord, Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) ("When clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate
threat to public safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is
obvious .. "); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("[Flreedom of speech, though
not absolute ...'is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (the
Court took into consideration the clear and present danger of destruction of life, property, the
invasion of the right to privacy, and possibility of a breach of peace).
43. The clear and present danger test has not been applied in the following areas: ob-
scenity, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); libel, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952); statutes regulating the conduct of union officials, see American Communica-
tion Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); admission of an applicant to the Bar, see Konigsberg
v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
44. E.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Cohen v. California: 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
45. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
46. See, e.g., Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb: 414 U.S. 441 (1974); Kingsly Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951).
47. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
48. E.g., Milk Wagon Union v. Meadowmoor Drivers Union, 312 U.S. 287 (1941);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Critics49 of the clear and present test suggest that the theory
transforms the first amendment's protection into a "balancing test."
Often referred to as "absolutists," these critics reject any attempt to
regulate or punish speech."0 Justice Black aptly summarized this
philosophy when he noted, "[Tihe first amendment's unequivocal
command that there shall be no abridgement of the right of free
speech. . . shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all
the balancing that was to be done in this field.' At the crux of the
discontent with the balancing approach, Justice Black asserted, is a
fear that the
balancing test . . . tells us that no right to think, speak or publish
exists in the people that cannot be taken away if the Government
finds it sufficiently imperative or expedient to do so. . . . [Tihe
'balancing test' turns our 'Government of the people, by the peo-
ple and for the people' into a government over the people.
52
The Supreme Court, however, has never accepted this constitu-
tional theory as a guiding principle and has consistently asserted that
freedom of speech is not absolute.53 Conflicting interests must be
taken into consideration when regulation of constitutional rights are
at issue. In the fighting words context, the state's legitimate interest
in peace and order cannot be ignored.
One commentator 54 suggests an approach that would reconcile
these two philosophies. Under this approach, the substantive merit
of the speech would not be subject to investigation; it would be pre-
sumed that such speech has some worth. The sole element of the
speech subject to balancing would be the gravity of the danger in-
volved, and only a very grave danger would suffice for punishment
or regulation of speech. Furthermore, even if a particular danger
49. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally A.
MERLKEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 91 (Ist ed. 1948);
Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger, "27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 325 (1952); Revital-
izing the Clear and Present Danger Test, supra note 14.
50. One author has noted that:
A recurring debate in modern first amendment juridprudence has been whether the
first amendment rights are 'absolute' in the sense that government may not abridge
them at all, or whether the first amendment requires the 'balancing' of competing
interests in the sense that free speech values and government's competing justification
[for regulating or prohibiting free speech,] must be isolated and .weighed in each case.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582 (1978).
Compare, Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821
(1962), with, Frantz: The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962). See gener-
ally Gunther, In Search ofJudicial Quality on a Changing Court. The Case ofJustice Powell, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972); Kalvin, Upon Re-reading Mr. Justice Black on the First 4mend-
ment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 428 (1967).
51. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). For an
excellent discussion on Mr. Justice Black's interpretation of the first amendment see Kalvin,
Upon Re-reading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 428 (1967).
52. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 67-68 (1961).
53. See note 3 supra.
54. Revitalizing the Clear and Present Danger Test, supra note 14, at 7 I.
were deemed grave enough to justify proscription of speech, that
danger would have to be imminent to permit restriction of the free-
dom of speech,5 regulation or punishment. This approach is readily
adaptable to cases that presently fall within the ambit of the fighting
words doctrine. By focusing on the circumstances surrounding the
objectionable utterance, the Court would only proscribe speech that
threatens to breach the peace and not merely annoy or insult an indi-
vidual.
The clear and present danger test could accommodate those sit-
uations that currently evoke the fighting words doctrine, but for the
focus of the latter test on personal insult. A speech delivered before
a crowd that angers, insults, or advocates violence is presently
deemed to be within the protection of the first amendment unless it
appears there is a clear and present danger that unlawful activity will
occur.5 6 Fighting words as defined in Chaplinsky, however, are not
afforded equivalent first amendment protection. 7
This distinction has no rational basis. Whether crowds or indi-
viduals are being addressed, the state remains concerned with the
potentiality of violent responses to a speaker's remarks. This reac-
tion can be elicited whether the speech is directed to a large audience
or to an individual personally.
The Supreme Court, however, did not immediately reject this
dichotomy. Shortly after the initial articulation of the fighting words
doctrine in Chaplinsky, the Court in Terminello v. Chicago58 reaf-
firmed that fighting words were not constitutionally protected. The
case arose out of a speech that Terminello delivered before an audi-
ence in which he referred to his opposition as "bed bugs," "snakes,"
and "atheistic, communistic Jews."59 The Court reversed the convic-
tion on the grounds that the statute pursuant to which Terminello
had been convicted, was overbroad because it permitted conviction
not only for fighting words, but for constitutionally protected speech
as well.6" The determination that the ordinance was unconstitution-
55. Id
56. See notes 22 & 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
58. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
59. Id at 20-21. Terminiello was arrested and subsequently found guilty of disorderly
conduct in violation of a city ordinance that provided:
All persons who shall make, and contenance, or assist in making any improper noise,
riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace,
within the limits of the city . . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be severally fined not less than a dollar nor more than
two hundred [dollars] for each offense.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2 (1949) (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 193-
1 (1939)).
60. Significantly, in light of Chaplinsky, the Court noted:
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to an-
ally overbroad relieved the Court of the responsibility of considering
whether Terminello's speech fell within the fighting words doc-
trine.6'
In Feiner v. New York,6 2 however, the Court asserted that the
application of the fighting words doctrine was inappropriate when
speech is not directed to a particular individual. In Feiner, the
speaker verbally insulted and attempted to incite a large audience to
partake in violent activity.63 In upholding Feiner's conviction the
Court maintained that such a speaker may be punished only if there
is a clear and present danger that unlawful violence would actually
occur.64 The requisite clear and present danger was satisfied by one
violent exchange that took place prior to Feiner's arrest.
Eighteen years after Feiner, the Court in Street v. New York
65
reaffirmed the status of fighting words as a class of unprotected
speech. Street, upon hearing of the shooting of a civil rights leader,
took an American flag that he owned to a street comer and set it on
fire. As a crowd gathered, Street shouted, "We don't need no damn
flag . . . and if they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an
American flag."' 66 Street was arrested and convicted under a statute
that made it a misdemeanor to "publicly. . . mutilate, deface, defile
or defy, . . . or cast contempt upon any American flag by words or
ger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. .... That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or pun-
ishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious sub-
stantive evil.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. at 4.
The Court held that the statute, as construed by the trial court, permitted conviction of
speech that, "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute or brought about a condition of
unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand." Id
61. Recalling the Chaplinsky definition of fighting words, it is submitted that Termi-
niello's speech would not have technically fallen within the purview of the doctrine. See note
26 and accompanying text supra.
62. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
63. Feiner was addressing a crowd comprised of both blacks and whites who had gath-
ered on a city sidewalk and street. Addressing the crowd through a loud speaker system,
Feiner made derogatory remarks concerning President Truman, the American Legion, the
Mayor of Syracuse, and other local officials. The crowd became restless and excited as Feiner
urged that blacks rise up in arms and fight for equal rights. Police twice requested Feiner to
refrain from speaking. After the third refusal by Feiner, he was arrested and subsequently
convicted of violating § 722 of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW (McKinney). The statute provides:
Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of.the peace, or whereby a breach of
the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts, shall be deemed to
have committed the offense of disorderly conduct:
(1) Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct
or behavior;
(2) Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offen-
sive to others.
(3) Congregate with others on a public street and refuses to move on when ordered
by the police.
Id at 315-16.
64. Id at 319.
65. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
66. Id at 579.
act."' 67 The Court reversed the conviction, finding that Street's
words did not fall within the fighting words doctrine for they were
not directed or intended to incite any unlawful reaction on the part
of any particular member of the crowd.68 Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that even if Street's words were fighting words, his conviction
would still be reversed because the New York statute was not drawn
narrowly enough to punish only fighting words.69
Accordingly, the law surrounding fighting words subsequent to
Street can be summarized as follows: The Supreme Court clearly
established a class of speech entitled fighting words that evoked no
constitutional protection. 7' The doctrine of fighting words as origi-
nally defined placed emphasis on the abusive nature of the words
expressed. 7' For the doctrine to be applied, the offensive discourse
had to be directed at a particular individual and the potential for
violent response was judged by an average addressee standard.72 Of-
fensive speech directed at a crowd could be punished or regulated
only upon a showing that there was a clear and present danger that
unlawful activity would occur. 73 Last, a conviction even for articu-
lating fighting words must be pursuant to a statute drawn with suffi-
cient narrowness that only unprotected speech is punished.
Although the Court in Street reaffirmed the fighting words doc-
trine, the Court clearly indicated that, "under our Constitution the
public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."74 Thus, the
mere offensiveness of the speech is an insufficient ground for its pro-
hibition or punishment. Tacitly the Court in Street was searching
for another rationale on which to support convictions for fighting
words. In fact, the modern fighting words doctrine reflects a transi-
tion from the emphasis on the content of the words expressed to a
focus on the actual immediacy of violent confrontations.
67. Id at 576.
68. The Court determined that Street's words
[allone, did not urge anyone to do anything unlawful. They amounted only to some-
what excited public advocacy of the idea that the United States should abandon, at
least temporarily, one of its national symbols. It is clear that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the States from imposing criminal punishment for public advocacy of
peaceful change in our institutions.
Id at 59 1.
69. Id
70. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. The concept of a direct correlation
between the utterance of insulting or abusive words and violent retaliation was accepted by the
Supreme Court apparently without question.
72. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
74. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
III. The Modern Fighting Words Doctrine
Increasingly profanity has filtered into the public vocabulary.75
It is not unusual to find opinions and emotions couched in "offensive
terms." Perhaps the extensive use of these words and phrases in
public has led many people to become somewhat desensitized to
their utterance. Correspondingly, it is clear that present society will
tolerate the employment of profanity or "offensive" terms to a
greater extent than previously.
The Supreme Court's decisions in fighting words cases since
Street v. New York 76 reflect this growing tolerance for abusive or
profane words. The Court has steadily amplified the impression left
by Street that the mere offensiveness of the words expressed is an
insufficient rationale for the punishment of speech. The modern
fighting words doctrine shifts the focus of its analysis to whether
there is an imminent threat of unlawful reaction by the actual ad-
dressee, rather than retaliation by the average addressee. The
Supreme Court has, therefore, specifically superimposed the clear
and present danger test onto the fighting words doctrine.
In Cohen v. Caiforn ia77 the Court clarified the weight to be
given to the offensiveness of the utterance in an analysis of "fighting
words." The defendant was arrested for "disturbing the peace [by]
offensive conduct," when he wore a jacket inscribed with the phrase,
"F - - - the Draft, ' 78 in a courthouse corridor. In reversing the con-
viction, the Court found that the defendant had been convicted for
the offensiveness of the words he employed and not for "any sepa-
rately identifiable conduct."7 9 Determining that the words on Co-
hen's jacket were not employed in a "personally provocative
fashion,"8 the Court concluded that Cohen's speech did not fall
within the fighting words exception to constitutionally protected
speech. Significantly, the Court noted that a fear or apprehension of
an altercation was insufficient to hold speech outside the ambit of the
first amendment. 8' The Court asserted that, "so long as the means
75. See Stewart v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 321, 323 (D.D.C. 1976) (where the court
held that "the term m - - f - ----- is an everyday expression that punctuates everyday
street language. The term has been debased by overuse to non-meaning.").
76. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
77. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
78. Id The Court of Appeals found that the term offensive conduct referred to "behavior
that has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." Id
The Supreme Court, however, determined that "[tihe only conduct which the State sought to
punish is the fact of communication." Id
79. Id at 18.
80. Id There was no evidence that there was any violent arousal or retaliation by those
who witnessed Cohen's jacket, or that he intended such a reaction. Id at 20.
81. Id at 23. The Court stated:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only
verbal tumult, discord and even offensive utterance. That the air may at times seem
filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.
are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of accept-
ability. . . . [O]ne man's vulgarity, after all, is another's lyric."82
One year later, the Court elaborated on the new focus to be
given to the fighting words doctrine. In Gooding v. Wilson83 the de-
fendant was convicted pursuant to a Georgia statute that prohibited
the use of "opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause
a breach of the peace."84 The action arose out of the defendant's
attempt to block the entrance of an army installation.8 5 During an
attempt to remove him, the defendant shouted to one police officer,
"White Son of a b - - - -, I'll kill you" and, "You son of a b - ,
I'll choke you to death .. ."' The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the grounds that the Georgia statute was overbroad
because it prohibited the use of unprotected and protected speech.
The fact that the defendant's words may have fallen within the term
fighting words, the Court announced, did not rectify the statute's
overbreath.
The Supreme Court's reasoning is noteworthy for it clearly sig-
nalled another departure from prior analysis of fighting words cases.
Although the Court extensively referred to the Chaplinsky definition
of fighting words, the majority opinion implicitly altered that defini-
tion. The Court indicated that the Georgia statute would have per-
mitted a speaker to be convicted even if the abusive language was
directed to "[o]ne who, on account of circumstances or by virtue of
the obligation of office, cannot then and there resent the same by a
breach of the peace.87 In registering objection to this possible con-
struction, the Court indicated its dissatisfaction with the average ad-
dressee approach to the question of the potentiality for violent
response. In effect, the Court was requiring that offensive words pro-
voke an imminent threat of violent retaliation by the actual ad-
dressee.
In Chaplinsky the Court designated fighting words a class of
constitutionally unprotected speech.88 Consequently, such speech
We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and
annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental
societal values are truly implicated.
Id. at 24-25.
82. Id at 25. The Court continued: "How is one to distinguish this from any other
offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically platable to the most squeamish among us." Id
83. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
84. Id at 519.
85. Wilson was one of a group of persons who, on August 18, 1966, picketed an army
installation carrying signs opposing the war in Viet Nam. When inductees arrived at the
building the protestors blocked the entrance. The protestors refused to move. Police officers
attempted to remove the demonstrators by force and a scuffle ensued. Id at 518.
86. Id. at 519-20 n.I.
87. Id at 526.
88. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
could be punished without requiring that there be a clear and pres-
ent danger that the actual addressee would become violent. In con-
trast, the Court in Gooding, by insisting that fighting words cause a
violent response by the actual addressee, tacitly applied the clear and
present danger test to a fighting words situation. In so doing, the
Court applied a test that is traditionally invoked only for protected
speech.89
In Hess v. Indiana9" the Supreme Court further altered the ap-
plication of the fighting words doctrine, as enunciated in Chaplinsky,
by stressing the context in which the speech took place rather than its
content. The defendant was arrested during an anti-war demonstra-
tion for loudly shouting, "We'll take the f ------ street later,"',
and was subsequently convicted for violation of the Indiana disor-
derly conduct statute.92 The Court determined that Hess' statement
did not amount to fighting words, even though it was insulting, be-
cause the statement was not directed to any particular person. 93 In-
terestingly, the Court acknowledged that at the very worst, Hess'
speech consisted of advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite fu-
ture time. Finding an absence of a clear and present danger of sub-
stantial evil, the Court overturned the conviction.94
The Supreme Court's decisions in Street, Cohen, Gooding, and
Hess clearly exemplify the change in focus in the modern applica-
tion of the fighting words doctrine from its original expression.
These decisions indicate that the Court has rejected the average ad-
dressee approach and is instead carefully scrutinizing the individual
circumstances surrounding the objectionable speech.
Illustrating that this new approach is firmly established is the
most recent examination9 5 of the fighting words doctrine in Lewis v.
89. One commentator aptly noted, "[T]hough purporting to apply Chaplinsky, the Court
in Gooding, in fact overruled it. . . . [Tihe majority adopted a definition of fighting words
[that] for all practical purposes, removed them from unprotected status and placed them under
the guardianship of the first amendment." Don't Bother to Smile, supra note 15, at 14-15. Jus-
tice Blackmun acknowledged in dissent that, "the Court despite its protestations to the con-
trary is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972).
90. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
91. Id The defendant made his comment while he was standing at the side of a street
being cleared by the sheriff and deputies. When the defendant expressed his opinion his back
was to the sheriff, who testified that, although he was offended by the language, he did not
interpret the speech as being directed personally at him. Id
92. The statute under which Hess was arrested reads in pertinent part:
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or by
tumultous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to
fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct ....
Id at 105.
93. Id at 107.
94. Id
95. Two fighting words cases appeared before the Supreme Court prior to Lewis v. New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), however, both were reversed and remanded without opinion.
In the first case, Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), the defendant employed
New Orleans.96 The defendant's arrest and subsequent conviction97
was precipitated by her reference to a police officer as a "god damn
mother-f ------ police [officer]." 98 In reversing the conviction,
the majority held that the ordinance plainly permitted conviction for
speech other than fighting words and was, therefore, unconstitution-
ally overbroad.99 Particular attention was paid to the statutory pro-
hibition of "opprobrious language"'" that the majority believed
embraced protected as well as unprotected speech.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion focused on the potentiality,
or lack thereof, for a violent confrontation between the defendant
and the police officer. In language reminiscent of the holding in
Gooding, Justice Powell found it highly unlikely that such an ex-
change would take place between a middle-aged woman and a po-
lice officer.'' Apparent in Justice Powell's opinion is the recurring
theme that a clear and present danger of violent reaction must be
the term m -- --- f - ---- in his description of the area's racial problems during a speech
made before the school board. After the meeting, the defendant was charged with using "loud
and offensive language in a public place" in violation of a New Jersey statute. Id The
Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded for consideration in light of Cohen and
Lewis. The statute permitted conviction for utterances "that affected the sensibilities of a
hearer." Id It is submitted that the New Jersey statute was overbroad for it permitted punish-
ment for speech that merely offends, contra to the holding in Cohen. Moreover, the circum-
stances surrounding the speech were void of any imminent threat of violence, as required by
the Court's holding in Gooding.
In the second case, Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972), the defendant referred to the
Tulsa police department as "m ----- f -. ----- fascist" pig cops and called one particular
officer a "black m - f - pig," in the course of a speech made at the University of
Tulsa. Id at 911 (Rehnquest, J., dissenting). The defendant was arrested and subsequently
convicted pursuant to an Oklahoma statute that prohibited "any obscene or lascivious lan-
guage or word in any public place... " Id The Court remanded without opinion for con-
sideration in light of Cohen and Gooding.
96. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
97. 1d The defendant was convicted of violating a New Orleans ordinance making it
unlawful to "curse, revile, or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference
to a police officer while in the performance of his duties... . Id at 132.
98. Id at 131, n. 1. The defendant's son had been placed under arrest and was being
transported in a police car to the police station. The defendant and her husband followed in
their own truck. Another police car stopped the Lewis auto and asked to see Mr. Lewis' li-
cense whereupon Mrs. Lewis responded in vulgar terms. Id The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded in light of Gooding, 408 U.S. 913 (1972). The conviction was sustained by the Loui-
siana Supreme Court, which held that the New Orleans ordinance applied only to fighting
words uttered to specific persons at a specific time... " New Orleans v. Lewis, 263 La. 809,
269 So. 2d 450, 456 (1972). The Supreme Court once again reversed and remanded. Lewis v.
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
99. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974).
100. The Court defined opprobrious words as: "embrac[ing] words conveying or in-
tending to convey disgrace. . . [those that] do not by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incide an immediate breach of the peace." Id at 130-33.
101. Mr. Justice Powell wrote:
Quite apart from the ambiguity inherent in the term, opprobrious words may or may
not be 'fighting words', depending upon the circumstances of their utterance. It is
unlikely, for example, that the words said to have been used here would have precipi-
tated a physical confrontation between the middle-age woman who spoke them and
the police officer in whose presence they were uttered. The words may well have
conveyed anger and frustration without provoking a violent reaction from the officer.
Id at 135 (Powell, J., concurring).
present before a conviction for fighting words will be upheld today.
Further supporting this proposition is the Court's handling of four
subsequent fighting words cases. In all four cases the judgments
were vacated and remanded without opinion for further considera-
tion in light of Lewis. 102 Considering the posture of these cases,
10 3
this action clearly demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to
embrace the modern fighting words doctrine.
IV. Lower Court Interpretations of the Modern Fighting Words
Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court has not recently dealt with the
fighting words doctrine in an explicit manner, litigation in the lower
102. See Karlan v. Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Rosen v. California, 416 U.S. 924
(1974); Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974). In each of
the cases the majority found the respective statute to be overbroad. Justice Douglas dissented
in each case, asserting that the majority's decision was inadequate. Stressing the fact that the
state courts had been given an opportunity to more narrowly define their statutes, Justice
Douglas advocated reversal of all four cases rather than remanding them.
103. Although the majority vacated and remanded without opinion, Justice Douglas' dis-
sent in Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 929 (1974), gives some indication as to the
majority's rationale.
In Karlan the defendant shouted at a police officer the following statements: "I hate all of
you f- - - - cops" and "Get out of my way you f - - - - ass cops." 39 Ohio St. 2d 107,
314 N.E. 2d 162, 163 (1974). The defendant was arrested and convicted pursuant to an ordi-
nance that provided for the punishment of "noisy, boisterous, rude, insulting or other disor-
derly manner with the intent to [be] abusive or annoy .. " 416 U.S. 924, 929. Justice
Douglas found the relevant statute overbroad since it "prohibits words which are merely 'rude'
and has not been limited to words which 'by their utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of peace.'" 1d On remand the judgment was affirmed. Concinnati v.
Karlan, 39 Ohio St. 2d 107, 314 N.E.2d 162, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
In Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), the defendant referred to a police officer as
"big bad mother f- -.. cop," a "chicken s - - - mother f - - - -", and "sorry son of a
b -.- -. " Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The defendant was subsequently arrested and con-
victed for violation of a statute that prohibited the "use of any profane, violent, vulgar, abusive
or insulting language . . . which . . . is calculated to arouse to anger the person about or to
whom it is spoken ... " Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 929 (1974) (Douglas, W.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas asserted that the statute was overbroad as it permitted punish-
ment for words, "which, though not likely to cause a breach of peace, are 'calculated' to do
so." Id at 930. Upon remand the Supreme Court of Arkansas reaffirmed, 257 Ark. 726, 520
S.W.2d 224, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 807 (1975).
In Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974), the defendant shouted to a police officer, "get away
from the f- - door and get the f- - - out of here." City of Kent v. Kelly, 44 Ohio St.
2d 43, 337 N.E.2d 788, 789 (1975). The arrest was based on a Kent ordinance that provided,
"[N]o person shall ... conduct himself in a noisy, boisterous or other disorderly manner...
which disturb[s] the good order and quiet of the municipality." Id. at n.2. Justice Douglas
rejected the Ohio court's determination that Kelly's speech fell within the fighting words doc-
trine and asserted that the statute was overbroad. Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Ohio
reversed the conviction. City of Kent v. Kelly, 44 Ohio St. 2d 43, 337 N.E.2d 788 (1975).
Last, in Rosen v. California, 416 U.S. 924 (1974), the defendant shouted, "I don't have to
stand for that f - - - s - " and I don't give a f - - -," to a police officer in protest
against a security search of his person. 42 U.S.L.W. 3086 (1973). The defendant was arrested
and found to be in violation of a California statute that prohibited the use of "vulgar, profane,
or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and
boisterous manner .... " 416 U.S. at 931 (1974). Justice Douglas found the statute over-
broad because it punished speech that was constitutionally protected. Justice Douglas pro-
claimed, "It hardly needs stating that States are not free to penalize speech merely because it is
'coarse' 'ill bred' or 'hardly suitable'. " Id at 932.
courts has been plentiful. The majority of lower court rulings reflect
the Supreme Court's modern interpretation of the fighting words
concept. In particular, these decisions have required that statutory
prohibitions be narrowly drawn to punish only fighting words that
are likely to arouse an immediate unlawful reaction on the part of
the actual addressee. 1
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Representative of this trend is Hammond v. Adkinson '05 wherein
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction
of a woman for the use of "profane, violent abusive or insulting lan-
guage. °"' 6 The court recalled the principle announced in Lewis and
Gooding and declared that, "the words must do more than offend,
cause indignation or anger the addressee to lose the protection of the
first amendment."0 7 An additional prerequisite for a valid applica-
tion of the breach of peace statute was demanded by the court. The
words must be employed "under such circumstances that [are] likely
to arouse to immediate and violent anger the person to whom they
[are] addressed."'0 8 Finding that the requisite circumstances were
absent, the court overruled the verdict.
Similarly, in Downs v. Maryland,°9 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland emphasized the absence of an imminent threat of violent
retaliation by the addressee. While in a crowded cafeteria in which
one state trooper and several black persons were present, the defend-
ant remarked in a loud voice, "all the god damn policemen in this
city are no f ------ good, they're just after me. "0 A few moments
later he shouted, "the f---- n ------ in this county are no
better than goddam policemen,""' whereupon he was placed under
arrest by the state trooper. 112 The court reversed the conviction de-
claring that the "only speech which can be punished, in this context,
is that which has a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the
person to whom individually, the remark is addressed."" 3 The court
emphasized that fighting words have some social value and are,
104. See, e.g., United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977); Stecher v. Ashew,
432 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Fla. 1977); White v. Florida, 330 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976).
105. 536 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976).
106. Id. The defendant was arrested when she responded to the frisking, by police officers,
of a relative by shouting: "You mother f - ----- son of a b ---- think you can come out
and do anything that you want to do." Id at 238. At that point, the police officer told her she
was under arrest. The defendant then exclaimed, "You mother f - - pig is not gonna
carry me anywhere. Id.
107. Id at 239.
108. Id
109. 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d 41 (1976).
110. Id at 42.
I1l. Id
112. The defendant was arrested pursuant to a Maryland statute that provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall act in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the public peace . . . at
any place of. . .public resort or amusement. . . or in any store during business hours . . . in
any city, town or county of this state." Id. at 43.
113. Id at 44.
therefore, not punishable per se.' I4 Consequently such speech can
be punished only when the likelihood exists for an imminent distur-
bance and when the offensive words are directed to a particular indi-
vidual. 5 The court asserted that the state trooper's concern for the
black patrons was insufficient evidence of an imminent threat of vio-
lence.
In accord is the recent decision of Harbin v. Florida. 116 In Har-
bin the appellant was arrested when she uttered profanity at a dep-
uty sheriff who had been sent to accompany the appellant's husband
to the couple's trailer after a domestic dispute. The district court
focused the inquiry on, "whether appellant's admittedly profane
words tended to incite an immediate breach of peace."" 7 Unable to
find the necessary threat of a disturbance, the court promptly re-
versed the conviction.
Last, the court in United States v. Sturgill"8 had no difficulty in
labeling the defendant's statement, "[G]et your damn ass out of the
way before I run through you. . . . ," as fighting words. The
court, however, noted that the statute pursuant to which the defend-
ant was convicted 20 was unconstitutionally overbroad. Referring to
the Supreme Court's decision in Gooding, 2' the circuit court con-
cluded that the Kentucky statute unconstitutionally permitted con-
viction for protected as well as unprotected speech. 2 2 Consequently,
the determination that the speech in question constitutes fighting
words is only one facet of the overall constitutional inquiry. The
statute upon which the conviction is based must also be narrowly
drawn to punish expression of only those words that tend to incite an
immediate breach of peace.
The majority of lower court decisions 23 reflect the Supreme
Court's present focus on the imminency of violent response. In fact,
114. Id
115. Id at 43-45. (The State Trooper indicated that she was not personally aroused by the
comments, but placed the defendant under arrest out of concern for the racially mixed pa-
trons).
116. 358 So. 2d 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
117. Id
118. 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977).
119. Id The arrest and subsequent conviction were precipitated by an altercation that
took place at the United States Naval Ordinance Station in Louisville, Kentucky, between
Sturgill and a security guard at the station.
120. The pertinent part of the Kentucky statute under which the defendant was convicted
reads: "A person is guilty of harassment when with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another
person he . . .in a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display or
addresses abusive language to any person present. United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307
(6th Cir. 1977).
121. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
122. United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977).
123. See, e.g., Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906
(1975); Stewart v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976); Eagle v. Andrea, 418 F.
Supp. 126 (D.S.D. 1976); City of St. Louis v. Tinker, 592 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1976).
the court in Collin v. Smith 24 perceptively noted, "[A]fter cases such
as Cohen v. Caliornia,. . . Gooding v. Wilson and Brandenburg v.
Ohio, . . . [it is questionable] whether the tendency to induce vio-
lence approach would pass constitutional muster today."' 25 The ex-
acting scrutiny on the actual threat of violence that is exhibited by
the current trend of court decisions supports such a proposition.
26
There has not, however, been complete consensus in the lower
courts. A minority of the courts continue to cling to the Chaplinsky
definition of, fighting words, t 27 often employing the doctrine as a
catch-all for punishment of anti-social behavior. Illustrative of this
proposition is the case of Fenton v. Stear. 128 In Fenton the district
court decreed that a student's use of profanity toward a teacher in a
public place was not constitutionally protected speech. 29 Interest-
ingly, the student's discourse took place on a Sunday, and he ex-
pressed the statement from a parked car in a shopping center located
several miles from the school. As the teacher drove by the student's
car, one of the student's friends shouted, "There's Stears."' 3 The
student replied loudly, "He's a p - - - -. '" Clearly no imminent
threat of violence by the addressee was present. Both concerned par-
ties were in cars and leaving the spot where the confrontation oc-
curred. The court, however, was reluctant to interfere with the
school's subsequent discipline of the student despite the absence of
124. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). Members of the Nationalist Socialist Party brought
suit seeking a declaration that three Skokie, Illinois ordinances were unconstitutional. The
court of appeals held:
(1) Ordinance prohibiting dissemination of materials which promote hatred to-
wards persons on the basis of their heritage was unconstitutional.
(2) Permit for proposed march could not be denied on basis of anticipated viola-
tions of ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of materials which promote hatred
toward persons on basis of their heritage.
(3) Ordinance prohibiting members of political party from assembling while wear-
ing military style uniforms was unconstitutional and,
(4) Ordinance requiring certain persons who wish to parade or assemble in village
of Skokie to obtain liability insurance . . . could not be constitutionally applied to
prohibit proposed demonstration.
Id at 1197-98. The court of appeals escaped having to decide whether the case fell within the
purview of the fighting words doctrine, because the Village of Skokie conceded that it, "did not
rely on a fear of responsive violence to justify the ordinance[s]." Id. at 1203. The court held
that this concession eliminated any argument based on the fighting words doctrine. Id.
125. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978).
126. See notes 75-116 and accompanying text supra.
127. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
128. 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
129. Technically the case was brought by Fenton as a civil rights action against his former
high school seeking "injunctive relief, compensatory damages, an apology from the defendants
and expunction of the plaintiff's disciplinary record." Id The court found that the plaintiff's
use of fighting words directed at his teacher was not entitled to constitutional protection and
that none of the plaintiffs constitutional rights had been violated. Moreover, the punishment
imposed on the plaintiff, to remain in a specific room to do his assigned schoolwork and disal-
lowing his attendance in a school trip, was de minimus and required dismissal of the federal
claim. Id at 771.
130. Id at 769.
131. Id
this threat.' 32 The court in Fenton, therefore, relied on the fighting
words doctrine as a means to punish socially unacceptable behavior.
The Fenton analysis of fighting words is reminiscent of Chaplin-
sky because of the court's emphasis on the offensiveness of the
speech rather than on the imminency of violent retaliation by the
actual addressee.' 33 Clearly, the Fenton decision is not in harmony
with the present Supreme Court interpretation of the fighting words
doctrine.
Two years after the decision in Fenton, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, in State v. Authelet, "3 acknowledged that the United
States Supreme Court's post-Chaplinsky rulings clearly established
that speech sought to be punished as fighting words must have a di-
rect tendency to result in an immediate disturbance. 35 The court,
however, reiterated the test set forth in Chaplinsky, holding that the
test to be applied to the potentiality for violence is an "objective
one"'3 6 the familiar average addressee approach.
37
The average addressee standard is an attractive one because of
its equitable overtones. But the average addressee rule is inherently
faulty. Absent from the standard is criteria by which to judge what
is average. Moreover, it has never been made clear what group of
people will act as a barometer for what is proper or improper behav-
ior in any given circumstance. Furthermore, the average addressee
standard tends to be conservative and discounts unusual or novel
forms of behavior or expression. The approach is particularly offen-
sive in the realm of freedom of speech precisely because of this ho-
mogenizing effect. As the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago
138
acknowledged:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is
.. .protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produe a clear and present danger of a serious substan-
132. Id at 772.
133. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
134. -R.I.-, 385 A.2d 642 (1978).
135. Id at 649.
136. Id The court asserted that, "[tihe test to be applied when the prosecution relies on
the fighting words theory is an objective one: are the defendant's expressions words which,
when directed to the average person, would cause the addressee to fight?" Id
Accord, Bousquet v. State, 261 Ark. 262, 548 S.W.2d 125 (1977); People ex rel. Van
Meveren v. County Court, -Colo.-, 551 P.2d 716 (1976). Contra, Lewis v. New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); Hammond v. Adkinson, 536
F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976).
137. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
138. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
tive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas
either b legislatures, courts or dominant political or community
groups.
The few lower courts that ignore this counsel and continue to em-
ploy the average addressee approach, placing emphasis on the offen-
siveness of the words expressed, are clearly not in accord with the
Supreme Court's present interpretation of the fighting words doc-
trine.
V. The Erosion of the Fighting Words Doctrine Into the Clear
and Present Danger Test
Justice Holmes wrote in 1912 that "it is one of the misfortunes
of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a
long time cease to provoke further analysis."' 4 ° The time for re-ex-
amination of the fighting words doctrine is long overdue. The mod-
ern expression and application of the doctrine illustrates that the
Supreme Court has clearly deviated from the principle as originally
promulgated. The initial expression of the fighting words doctrine
required the application of an average addressee standard to the po-
tentiality for violent retaliation, and focused on the content of the
communication, rather than on the context within which it was ut-
tered. 4"' The Supreme Court in Chap/insky adopted the implied leg-
islative judgment that the proliferation of abusive words is directly
related to violent confrontations. 42 Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, however, indicate that the fighting words doctrine is to be nar-
rowly construed. Moreover, contemporary opinions evidence a shift
away from a content focus, to an examination of the context of the
utterance. The present articulation of the theory requires a showing
of a clear and present danger that the actual addressee will respond
violently before speech will be held to be outside the protection of
the first amendment.
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The fighting words doctrine has been so eroded from its original
formulation that it is questionable whether it remains a viable mode
of constitutional analysis. Although the courts continue to cling to
the phrase "fighting words," in actuality the doctrine is a descriptive
term without analytical substance. Recent Supreme Court decisions
have implicitly rejected the dichotomy between speech addressed to
a crowd and that expressed to an individual personally.' 4 Conse-
139. Id at 4-5.
140. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
141. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
143. See generally Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Revitalizing the Clear and Present Danger Test, supra note 16, at 71.
144. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
quently, the methodology that the Court has superimposed is, in fact,
the clear and present danger test.
VI. Conclusion
The clear and present danger test should be employed openly to
those situations that presently invoke the fighting words doctrine.
The clear and present danger test has previously only been applied
explicitly to speech that is directed at a crowd. 45 This, however,
should not be an insurmountable barrier to the application of the test
to speech expressed to an individual personally. The concern in both
situations, the prevention of unlawful activity, is identical.
If the first amendment's protection is to remain vital, freedom of
speech should only be proscribed when the most urgent of circum-
stances are present.'46 Although any given constitutional test will
produce some uneven application, 47 possible insult to one's sensitiv-
ities may be a small price to pay, in the long run, for the benefits that
can be derived from free speech. Moreover, the object of abusive
speech can "avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities [by]
simply averting his eyes" or ears. 4 8 The remedy of a suit for slan-
der, libel, or invasion of privacy is not foreclosed either.
Society demands a great deal of the individual, much of which
may not be to his liking. The development of a "harder shell" is but
another concession that must be made to allow society to operate
effectively and in harmony with the spirit of the Constitution. As
Justice Black warned, "I do not believe that it can be too often re-
peated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly
guaranteed by the first amendment, must be accorded to the ideas we
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